This article examines the concept of a "rejecting referendum." It draws upon the scholarly works of S.A. Avakyan, V.D. Zorkin, J. Reestman, L. Bekan, and other academics. The research employs several scientific methods, including formal-legal, comparative-legal, and historical analysis. Given the scope of the article, the author proposes a definition for the term "rejecting referendum." It is noted that a "rejecting referendum" serves as an instrument of the people’s constituent power; the author argues that when this instrument is exercised as an expression of the people’s primary constituent power, it is not subject to substantive legal constraints. At the same time, the absence of substantive legal limitations on primary constituent power does not negate the necessity of upholding democratic guarantees to ensure that the will of the people is established freely and accurately. The reasons for the relevance of a "rejecting referendum" are identified.