Annotation

Purpose: to critically reflect on the idea of endowing “machines” with rights in the conditions of intersubjective reality, relying on the provisions of the communicative theory of law. Methodology is represented by structural-functional, legal-dogmatic and formal-logical methods. In the theoretical part the author introduces the concept of intersubjectivity, which is used as a starting point for assessing the possibility of “machine” subjectivity. In the empirical part of the study, to test the ability of the “machine” to become an equal human subject, the author uses the “Turing test” and the case of the state of Utah, where AI is used as a tool for dispensing prescription medications in the absence of direct medical supervision. Conclusions: modern law does not require the development of a new form of legal personality for AI, while the classical legal concept of legal personality requires a supporting anthropocentric interpretation. Scientific and practical significance: the author proposes a new criterion for delineation, which is necessary for recognizing a particular phenomenon as a subject of law, — “trust in the performance of a legal role”.