Annotation

This article offers a conceptual reconsideration of the thesis on the class nature of legal language. The author argues for the need to distinguish between two levels of legal language: the linguistic system (grammar, basic vocabulary), which is inherently national (social) and constitutes the basis of any public legal discourse, and discursive practices, where class (social-group) struggle actually unfolds. It is demonstrated that this struggle is waged not over language per se, but over the interpretation of legal ideas, the inconsistency of which is due to diverging social interests. The discursive harmonization of these interpretations leads to the development of conventional legal values, which are subsequently reflected in current legislation. As a result, a shift is proposed from the concept of "class languages" to the concept of a "struggle for meanings", which preserves the idea of class struggle in the legal sphere but shifts its focus from the linguistic system to the semantic field of legal ideas.