Annotation

The article is devoted to the theoretical and legal study of the nature of judicial review in pre-trial proceedings as an independent form of exercise of judicial power. The author's concept is based on the thesis about the methodological limitations of the traditional criterion for distinguishing between judicial review and justice, which is the presence or absence of a legal dispute: at the pre-trial stage, a conflict between public coercion and the constitutional rights of an individual is always present. The correct criterion for distinction is recognized as the difference in the subject of jurisdictional activity: justice resolves a criminal-legal conflict on the merits, while judicial review evaluates the constitutional admissibility, validity and proportionality of state coercion at the pre-trial stage. The conclusion that judicial review constitutes an independent subsidiary function of the court, implemented in the form of justice in its broad, guaranteeing sense, is substantiated. Five system-forming features of judicial review applicable to both national models have been identified, which allows for the verification of the author's concept in a comparative legal aspect.