Annotation

The purpose of this study is to establish the legal essence of artificial intelligence, which is considered by modern legal theorists both as a potential subject of civil law relations and as a tool through which an artificial intelligence operator implements his own legal personality without creating a new face of civil law. The author used theoretical research methods based on formal logic as a general scientific methodological basis. As a result of the research, the author came to the basic conclusion that it is impossible to recognize artificial intelligence as a legal entity of civil law. The scientific significance of this study lies in the fact that the author, within the framework of the existing scientific discussion on the recognition of the subjectivity of artificial intelligence, concluded that it was necessary to base the proposed concepts of legal personality on the classical materialistic theory of civil law, which recognizes the social genesis of law and its subjects. The practical significance of the work lies in the possibility of applying the author's conclusions in the development of regulations governing the activities of artificial intelligence.