Annotation

In this article, the author examines the nature of civil legal relations and the civil circulation of digital objects. Individual aspects of the content and characteristics of the emergence of subjective civil rights and the corresponding obligations of parties to digital legal relations are examined. It is established that the basic structure of digital legal relations remains unchanged, but a number of key features arise: a different legal fact as the basis for the emergence of a legal relationship; different content and means of implementing the subjective rights of parties. The author substantiates the proposition that an information system is a means of creating, modifying, and/or terminating subjective civil rights. Parties to legal relations are limited in the freedom to exercise their legal capacity, since their actions are limited by those of the owner of the information system. In conclusion, the author concludes that for legal relations to be recognized as digital, the presence of a digital component is necessary, which can be expressed both in the means of implementing subjective rights and obligations and in the environment in which they arise.