Annotation

The article examines the terminological and substantive inconsistency between the formulation "prosecution of a knowingly innocent person," enshrined in Article 299 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and the constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence. The authors conduct a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the criminal law category of "knowing innocence" and the procedural construct of the presumption of innocence established by Article 49 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation. The epistemological limits of an investigator's cognition regarding the question of a person's guilt or innocence at the stage of preliminary investigation are explored. Legislative amendments introduced by Federal Law No. 436-FZ of December 19, 2016, are analyzed in the context of differentiating the grounds for criminal liability under Article 299 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The authors formulate proposals for improving the disposition of the norm under consideration, ensuring a balance between the necessity of criminal law protection of the interests of justice and compliance with constitutional guarantees of individual rights.