Annotation

This article examines whether public oversight actors are capable of protecting public interests in the field of public procurement. The aim of the study is to determine the scope and mechanisms of such protection. The research employs formal-legal, comparative-legal, and systemic methods to analyse the legislation, enforcement practices, and the interaction between public organizations, the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS Russia), and prosecutorial authorities. The study establishes that, although public oversight actors do not possess public-authority powers, their activities indirectly safeguard public interests: complaints and inquiries submitted by civil society organizations frequently trigger official inspections, the cancellation of unlawful procurements, and the restoration of competitive conditions. The research identifies key limitations, including the absence of procedural capacity to independently represent public interests before a court and the uneven responsiveness of regional oversight authorities. The findings highlight the need to modernize legislation by clarifying the procedural status of public oversight actors, introducing mandatory standards for responding to their submissions, and potentially expanding their procedural powers.